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How	and	why	the	State’s	purchasing	power	should	be
used	to	renegotiate	PFI	deals
If	used	appropriately,	the	state’s	purchasing	power	could	result	in	new	terms	and	a	better	deal	for	taxpayers	when	it
comes	to	the	government’s	PFI	contracts.	The	CHPI	research	team	explain	why	it	is	necessary	to	renegotiate	and
how	this	may	be	done	in	order	to	limit	the	leakage	of	profits	and	avoid	additional	upfront	costs	of	buyouts.
A	Smith	Institute	report	recently	set	out	a	“progressive”	programme	to	reset	the	relationship	between	government
and	the	private	sector	when	delivering	public	services.	The	report	recommends	introducing	new	accountability
requirements	for	private	contractors	–	such	as	the	need	for	open	book	accounting	and	for	the	introduction	of	profit
caps.	These	are	viable	proposals	for	ensuring	that	future	government	to	business	contracting	prioritises	the	public
interest	and	places	business	under	a	duty	to	adhere	to	the	same	levels	of	accountability	as	public	bodies.	It
recognises	that	the	government	has	the	ability	and,	some	may	say,	the	duty	to	impose	requirements	on	companies
which	are	delivering	vital	public	services.
However,	these	proposals	do	not	deal	with	the	existing	legacy	of	PFI	contracts	and	other	public	private	partnerships
–	and	in	particular,	with	the	amount	of	scarce	public	resources	which	will	“leak”	out	of	the	public	sector	and	into	the
profit	accounts	of	PFI	companies	over	the	next	15	or	20	years.	In	the	NHS	alone	PFI	companies	are	likely	to	make
pre-tax	profits	just	short	of	£1	billion	over	the	next	5	years.	To	put	this	in	perspective,	it	is	almost	a	quarter	of	the	new
money	which	the	government	proposes	to	give	the	NHS	over	this	period.	And	this	relates	only	to	107	PFI	contracts
out	of	the	existing	700	or	so	PFI	deals	which	are	currently	in	operation	across	the	public	sector.
The	graph	below	from	one	of	the	earlier	PFI	contractors,	Balfour	Beatty,	shows,	the	leakage	of	taxpayer	funds
straight	into	PFI	profit	is	likely	to	grow	over	the	coming	years,	making	a	resolution	of	this	problem	even	more
pressing.
This	is	because	the	financing	of	PFI	deals	is	structured	in	the	following	way:	the	PFI	company	borrows	the	money
upfront	to	build	a	hospital;	once	the	hospital	is	built	the	public	sector	starts	paying	a	unitary	charge	to	use	it	over	a
25-30-year	period.	Out	of	this	unitary	charge	the	PFI	company	pays	back	the	lenders	and	whatever	tax	charges	are
required.	As	the	debt	is	paid	off	over	the	course	of	the	contract	the	amount	left	over	is	for	the	shareholders	in	the	PFI
company	to	keep	(shown	in	the	graph	as	“free	cash”).	So	towards	the	end	of	the	contract,	(in	many	cases	in	10	to	15
years	from	now)	a	significant	proportion	of	the	money	which	is	being	paid	by	the	NHS	for	PFI	hospitals	will	leak	out
straight	to	shareholder	profits.
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The	debt	element	of	these	schemes	is	also	an	issue.	We	know	from	the	National	Audit	Office	that	currently	around
half	of	the	£10bn	annual	payments	which	are	made	to	PFI	companies	goes	to	pay	back	the	banks	and	other	senior
lenders	to	the	scheme.	And	we	also	know	from	the	NAO	report	that	the	amount	the	taxpayer	is	paying	for	this	type	of
borrowing	is	around	4%	higher	than	if	the	state	had	borrowed	the	money	itself.	So	in	addition	to	the	excessive	profit
rates,	the	taxpayer	is	locked	into	a	hire	purchase	arrangement	which	will	continue	to	place	an	unnecessary	burden
on	public	expenditure	for	decades	to	come.
So	what	can	be	done	to	address	the	existing	legacy	of	PFI?	The	wriggle	room	on	these	deals	is	limited	and	this	was
a	deliberate	part	of	the	original	PFI	policy.	When	government	struck	the	original	deals,	it	was	so	keen	to	develop
arrangements	that	both	kept	the	projects	off	the	balance	sheet	and	incentivised	the	private	sector	to	put	up	the	cash
that	it	minimised	any	risks	to	investors.
To	start	with,	it	absolved	the	investors	of	any	demand	risk	–	so	that	even	if	the	public	sector	no	longer	has	the	need
for	the	school	or	hospital,	the	PFI	company	still	gets	paid.	As	the	NAO	report	shows,	Liverpool	City	Council	is	paying
£4million	a	year	for	a	school	which	it	no	longer	needs	and	which	stands	empty,	at	a	total	cost	of	£47m.
The	government	also	passed	legislation	to	guarantee	that	the	state	would	continue	to	meet	the	payments	if	public
sector	bodies	–	such	as	NHS	trusts	–	went	bankrupt	and	were	unable	to	pay	the	bills,	effectively	‘sheltering’	PFI
companies	from	the	impact	of	austerity.
Most	importantly,	the	government	removed	the	risk	to	the	investors	of	contract	termination	or	a	change	of	heart	by	an
incoming	government:	the	standard	Direct	Lender	agreement	sets	out	the	levels	of	compensation	which	PFI	lenders
are	entitled	to	in	the	event	the	public	sector	wants	to	terminate	the	contract.	And	as	the	NAO	shows,	on	top	of	having
to	pay	off	the	lenders	and	shareholders	for	their	losses	the	public	sector	would	also	have	to	buy	out	the	interest	rate
“swaps”	–	the	financial	instruments	used	by	PFI	companies	to	protect	against	the	possibility	of	interest	rate	rises	on
the	sums	they	have	borrowed	to	fund	the	projects.	Since	interest	rates	have	fallen,	the	public	sector	would	be
required	to	pay	an	additional	£2.3	billion	just	to	buy	out	the	“swaps”	on	£10bn	worth	of	PFI	deals.
So	what	tools	are	left	in	the	government’s	box	to	deal	with	this	legacy?	In	theory,	Parliament	could	seek	to	requisition
or	expropriate	the	assets	of	the	PFI	companies	without	providing	any	compensation	and	cease	all	payments	to	them.
But	this	extreme	move	would	almost	certainly	be	challenged	in	the	courts	both	domestically	and	internationally.	In
addition,	it	would	almost	certainly	mean	a	significant	rise	in	the	risk	premium	on	all	government	borrowing,	with
serious	consequences	for	the	government’s	freedom	of	action	across	the	board.
The	government	could	also	buy	out	the	contracts	and	pay	compensation	to	the	lenders	and	the	shareholders	at	the
rates	required	by	the	Direct	Lenders	Agreement.		Quite	why	any	government	would	commit	scarce	public	funds	to
providing	a	lump	sum	to	banks	and	shareholders	when	the	NHS	and	other	public	services	are	in	need	of	a	large
injection	of	cash	is	unclear.
However,	one	can	only	assume	that	the	PFI	companies	would	be	delighted	to	receive	an	upfront	return	on	their
investment	on	a	completely	risk	free	basis.	And,	as	the	NAO	points	out,	there	would	still	be	a	need	to	employ	the
workforce	and	buy	the	machinery	and	equipment	to	carry	on	running	and	maintaining	the	hospitals	and	schools.	So
extra	funding	would	be	needed	to	cover	these	costs.
Whilst	the	PFI	companies	appear	to	have	locked	out	any	potential	downsides	to	these	contracts,	the	state	still	wields
a	significant	amount	of	power	as	the	sole	purchaser	of	these	services.	Instead	of	considering	termination	or
nationalisation,	policy-makers	should	plan	to	use	their	power	and	enter	into	new	bargains	with	the	small	number	of
equity	investors	and	lenders	who	own	the	vast	majority	of	individual	PFI	companies.
A	number	of	suggestions	have	been	put	forward	along	these	lines.	For	example,	CHPI’s	Colin	Leys	has	suggested
that	in	order	to	encourage	a	re-negotiation	of	the	contracts	across	the	board,	Labour	could	signal	that	none	of	the
companies	which	currently	own	PFI	companies	could	expect	to	receive	any	business	from	a	future	Labour
government	if	they	refuse	to	renegotiate	the	terms	of	the	PFI	contracts.	The	NAO	has	suggested	that	the	state	may
wish	to	buy	up	equity	stakes	in	PFI	contracts	in	order	to	force	the	re-financing	of	these	deals,	although	this	would
mean	equity	holders	being	willing	to	sell	their	highly	lucrative	shares.
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John	McDonnell	MP,	the	Shadow	Chancellor,	has	signalled	that	it	might	be	possible	to	legislate	to	prevent	the
offshore	owners	of	some	PFI	companies	receiving	their	dividends,	presumably	through	tax	measures.	Labour
backbencher	Stella	Creasy	has	called	for	a	“windfall	tax”	on	PFI	profits.	This	is	in	part	to	claw	back	the	windfall	gains
which	PFI	companies	have	made	from	the	reduction	in	corporation	tax	from	30%	when	the	deals	were	signed	to	17%
by	2020	–	gains	which	our	research	shows	are	likely	to	net	NHS	PFI	companies	around	£190m	on	top	of	their
already	excessive	returns.
In	the	first	instance,	tax	policies	of	this	nature	could	potentially	recoup	much-needed	tax	revenues,	which	could	be
used	to	fund	the	growing	NHS	deficit.	But	more	importantly,	the	threat	of	imposing	a	tax	of	the	type	talked	about	by
McDonnell	and	Creasy	could	be	used	as	a	bargaining	chip	by	government	to	bring	the	PFI	companies	to	the	table	to
re-negotiate	the	existing	deals.	And	whilst	investment	analysts	have	few	concerns	about	the	termination	of	PFI	deals,
because	of	the	compensation	clauses	in	the	contract,	they	view	the	notion	of	a	tax	on	profits	as	a	“credible	threat”.
For	many	people	the	idea	of	re-negotiation	is	unpalatable,	given	the	extent	to	which	PFI	companies	have	“fleeced”
the	taxpayer	for	many	years.	However,	exploiting	the	government’s	advantage	as	the	sole	purchaser	of	services	and
payer	of	private	sector	debts	should	not	be	seen	as	a	capitulation.	If	used	appropriately	it	should	be	possible	to
dictate	new	terms	to	PFI	companies	to	get	a	better	deal	for	taxpayers,	to	limit	the	leakage	of	profits	and	to	avoid	any
additional	upfront	costs	of	buyouts	which	taxpayers	can	ill	afford.
______
About	the	Authors
This	was	written	by	the	CHPI	research	team.
All	articles	posted	on	this	blog	give	the	views	of	the	author(s),	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	British	Politics	and	Policy,
nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.	Featured	image	credit:	Pixabay/Public	Domain.
British Politics and Policy at LSE: How and why the State’s purchasing power should be used to renegotiate PFI deals Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-02-01
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/how-and-why-the-states-purchasing-power-should-be-used-to-renegotiate-pfi-deals/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
